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The Ethanol Renewable Identification Number Price Fight 
and Nebraska Agriculture 
  The petroleum industry has launched a fierce po-
litical fight against the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS), the regulations that require renewable 
fuels such as ethanol to be blended into the mo-
tor fuel supply. The industry complains that 
meeting those requirements has become too ex-
pensive. President Trump has been presiding 
over frequent White House meetings1 to address 
the issue, with corn-state senators leading corn/
ethanol constituents in confrontation with Texas 
senators leading the petroleum refiners. 
Contrary to claims from both sides, capping Re-
newable Identification Number (RIN) prices as 
proposed by petroleum interests would have little 
impact on the industry. The real threat is reduc-
tion of the blending mandates to levels below 
those stipulated in the 2007 legislation (which the 
EPA has apparently been achieving by granting 
waivers for small refineries). What follows is an 
explanation. 
What's an ethanol RIN? 
A RIN, is a certificate of origin from an ethanol 
manufacturer that corresponds to the production 
of a particular gallon of ethanol. Fuel blenders 
obtain the RIN when they buy the etha-
________________ 
1  Examples:  hƩps://www.reuters.com/arƟcle/us‐usa‐
biofuels‐trump/trump‐pushes‐big‐corn‐and‐big‐oil‐to‐
break‐biofuels‐deadlock‐idUSKCN1GD3VF ; 
hƩps://www.reuters.com/arƟcle/us‐usa‐biofuels‐trump/
senators‐ask‐trump‐to‐suspend‐epas‐use‐of‐biofuel‐
waivers‐idUSKBN1HG2SG 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  4-6-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  120.00  *  115.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  174.81  185.34  183.16 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  142.76  153.15  146.31 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  209.99  223.63  217.41 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  57.94  60.50  46.26 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74.69  74.23  67.76 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  154.36  138.15  145.73 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  342.41  NA  373.73 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.93  4.43  4.57 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.33  3.59  3.65 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.51  9.45  9.65 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.27  5.91  5.91 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.85  2.92  2.74 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  150.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65.00  97.50  97.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  67.50  *  * 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103.75  151.00  160.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.50  51.00  51.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
nol. They turn in the RINs to the EPA to prove that 
they have complied with their Renewable Volume Ob-
ligation (RVO) under the 2007 Energy Independence 
and Security Act (EISA). These regulations comprise 
what is known as the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS). 
Why does a RIN have a price? 
Because they are tradeable. The whole point of the RFS 
was to require more fuel ethanol to be burned than 
would result from the market without the interven-
tion. To achieve this extra consumption, buyers' price 
must be lowered to convince buyers to buy more. At 
the same time, the ethanol producers' price must be 
raised to convince them to produce more. This is a bit-
ter pill for the blenders caught in the middle, who now 
have the obligation to buy high and sell low (obtain a 
low value in the ethanol-gasoline blend) to achieve the 
higher volume requirement. 
 If RINs were not tradeable, each blender would just 
have to blend its own RVO, and there would be no 
such thing as a price for RINs. But tradability allows 
some blenders to avoid the blending process by pur-
chasing RINs (with no ethanol attached) from a blend-
er who has blended more than its own RVO (an E-85 
blender, for example).  
Blenders can't escape the pain. 
Blenders can either buy ethanol and blend it, losing 
money on every gallon, or buy just a RIN, but the hurt 
to the blender is about the same either way – the loss 
on each gallon blended is about the same as the price 
he must pay for the RIN. The ethanol RIN price is cur-
rently about $0.38 per gallon of RIN, a reflection of the 
price wedge between what the blender must pay to 
ethanol plants (around $1.35 per gallon currently in 
Nebraska) and the value of the ethanol in the gasoline 
blend. It's the cost (at the margin) imposed by the 
RVO. 
Why don't the blenders go broke doing this? 
The reason blenders don't go broke buying high and 
selling low is that they can pass the loss along to the 
motorist. They charge a high enough price for the 
blended gasoline (E10, etc.) to pay for the gasoline 
component and also make up the loss on the ethanol 
component. The petroleum industry quite rightly 
points to the cost of RINs as the cost of meeting the 
RVO, even though they do recoup that cost in the 
price they charge for blended gasoline.  
 
Didn't Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) re-
cently go bankrupt because of this? 
The petroleum industry would like us to think so, 
because this would enhance their arguments for 
scrapping or undermining the RFS. PES had been 
meeting its RVO by purchasing RINs rather than 
buying and blending ethanol, paying $217 million 
for RINs just in 2017. But as noted above, the cost 
of buying the required ethanol high and selling it 
low would have resulted in blending losses of a 
similar size. This cost is an obstacle that all blend-
ers have had to overcome. There is clearly some-
thing more involved in the PES bankruptcy, be-
cause we have not seen widespread bankruptcies in 
petroleum merchandising. 
What would happen if the price of ethanol RINs 
were to be capped? 
The answer is pretty simple: Not much! True, the 
volume of RINs traded would shrink. But even if 
the traded RIN volume went to zero, each blender 
would still be required to meet their RVO, inter-
nalizing the cost of buying high and selling low as 
described above. The total blending cost to the in-
dustry would be somewhat higher, because high-
cost blenders would have to blend and suffer that 
cost, rather than buy RINs from lower-cost blend-
ers. Tradability increases blending industry effi-
ciency. 
Capping the RIN price would reduce these effi-
ciency gains, but the ethanol volume would not 
change because the RVO sets that amount, and 
therefore the price of ethanol would not change 
significantly, if at all. 
What would happen to Nebraska if ethanol RINs 
were to be capped? 
No significant impact on volume of ethanol means 
no significant change in the volume of corn and 
thus no impact on either industry in Nebraska.  
Caveat: The renewable fuels market is more com-
plicated than described above. 
RVOs are specified on an annual basis, yet RINs 
can be carried over from one year to the next, cre-
ating a dynamic RIN price component not consid-
ered above. 
 
There are several nested categories of renewable fuels, 
and the above doesn't distinguish them or explain their 
interactions. For example, the "blend wall" implies that 
only at a very low price will motorists be convinced to 
buy blends with more ethanol than E10, and there are 
very few pumps to provide such blends. So biodiesel 
RINs are being used to satisfy RVOs for the ethanol 
category (any "renewable fuel"). 
These and other idiosyncrasies of the RFS make it diffi-
cult to explain and analyze the renewable fuels markets 
precisely and completely, but none of them lead to a 
contradiction of the logic explained above regarding a 
cap on the price of RINs. 
Don't be fooled: It's the RVO that matters.  
A recent industry report2 asserts that the EPA has re-
cently granted 25 small-refinery waivers, which given 
the relevant definition of "small", must total over 1 bil-
lion gallons. This implies a reduction of at least 7% in 
the 2018 RVO, which is a significant impact on the in-
dustry, and RIN prices dropped substantially in re-
sponse. 
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2 OPIS Ethanol and Biodiesel InformaƟon Service, April 9, 2018  
